Statistical \It variations lead to large variations of leakage current, which cause statistical voltage drops on the power grid that can affect circuit timing. We propose a statistical analysis technique ,!-hereby variances of the leakage currents are used to estimate the susceptibility to timing violations due to leakagcinduced voltage drops.
INTRODUCTION
hlanaging leakage is among the most eminent challenges t,o he hurdled by the integrated circuits industry, with the advent of deep-submicron technologies in the nanometer regime. High leakage conies as a price tag on better perforniance and reduced active pox-er, as a result of the need to Scale the hlOSFET threshold voltage, ( V c h ) , to accompany the reduction in supply voltages (lid*) and oxide thickness. This is because the decrease of 1 : h translates as an exponential increase in subtlmshold leakage current, I,=, reportedly as high as about 5X per generation [6] , with total leakage current in dense high-performance chips forecast t o he about half the total chip current [13] . In today's 1.2 \J, 0.13 pm technologies, Vj,, is about 0.3 V (25% of I&). Conipare these figures 15'1th older lpm technologies: using a supply voltage of 5V and having a threshold voltage of about, 0.8 V (IG% of V d d ) [26] . Clearly, the scaling trends of t,hreshold voltage do not keep up with those of supply voltage.
The disparity in scaling the supply and threshold voltages is specially consequential to pursuing agressive designs, inducing tighter design margins, thus placing process variations under deep scrutiny. In pahrular, since the gap bet w e n lZld and Vth has narrowed; variations in the level of supply voltage become very significant when it comes to meeting timing closure. The network t hat delivers supply voltage to circuit devices is referred to as the power grid. The consequences of pow-er grid voltage level variations in the estimation of a circuit timing vulnel-ability are being currently researched 12, 211, and it has been reported i n an industrial surx-ey that 50% of chips would fail to meet their timing requirements if no power grid 1-erification were done prior t o tapeout [I] . However, modern power grid verification tools fail to account for the contribution of leakage to the voltage drop on tlie power grid. The present paperaddresses this issue.
If leakage were uniform or predictable across tlie chip, then the contribution of leakage to the supply voltage drop can hesimply accounted for by adding a deterministic leakageinduced component to the total voltage drop on the porn-er grid. Hoivever, this is not the case and process lariations in I$,, and the transistor channel length cause exponentially larger variations in leakage currents, as a direct coilsequence of the exponential dependence of leakage currents on l<h or channel length [19, 241. In 0.1 p n~ technologyl it is possible to get 30 mV standard deviation in l i t h [15] . For w h o l~ chips, leakage variations have been measured at almost 20X . These variations are also known to have a significant withindie; local component [?, 5 ; 191 ; so that transistors in close proximity on the layout can have significant variations in their leakage currents. This is also referred to as mismatch and its effect on delay has been studied [SI.
We will assume statistical 1-aiiability of leakage c~~r r e n t s~ i.e., that the statistics of leakage current,s are available; Iritli the knodedge that both hlonte Carlo and andytical techniques can be used to obtain this information [??]. IT'hile worst-case analysis is necessary when considering poxr-er grid 1-oltage drop due to global, correlated die-to-die variations [4] in leakage currents, intra-die (or within-die) variations require statistical analysis in order to avoid ovedy pessimistic conclusions. There are no good tools today to estimate this statistical voltage drop on tlie power grid due to leakage current wriations.
In this work_ we consider leakage currents to be rarldorn and proceed to analyze the grid on that basis. The focus is placed on wit hin-die variations: which have been receiving a great deal of att,ention due lo tlie impact they are forecast to have in future technologies. In [lo]: a Inunierical Monte Carla approach \\-as proposed to calculate part iallp the second order statistirs of the pox-cr grid node voltages in response to within-die leakage airrent \.aviations. This approach n-as extended in [llj to Iolrnulate R statistical w rification n1ethodolo.g for the poix-er grid considering Irakage current variations; on a n iudividual node basis. This methodology, holyever, did not consider joint statistics of the voltage drops on t h e grid nodes, n-liich would lx i i r d r d n.hen sinniltaneom n l t a g e drop conditions (joint conditions on a set of nodes) are to be checked against. Joiiit nodal verification is essential when checkiug the supply voltage levels simultaneously on a critical path. This paper proposcs a \\-ay to d~a l with this situation. The result of this n r~k is to extract joint statistics of tlie leakage-induced coinpollent Proces-induwd variations on the leakage component of the total current are relevant in the context of this work. It is standard practice to break down these process variations into die-to-die and within-die components 120, 71. For the variations on a given parameter, the dieto-die component takes the same value for all instances of that parameter within a single chip, but differentiates among distinct chips. The within-die component causes,variations within a given chip, depending on location.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
We therefore model the total current as follows:
xhere I,,ti,, refers to the active current, I,E,~~,,, is the nominal value of leakage current at the design point, I o~. d d is the dieto-die component of leakage variations, and Ioe,lvd is the aithin-die component. of these variations. By linearity of the power grid, u e can add the contributions of t,he four current components in (1) to get the total voltage drop on the power grid, as fOlhws:
In general, die-to-die variations can be dealt with efficiently using case file analysis. This is also applicable for examining the response of the pomr grid due to die-to-die leakage current variations, since the grid is known to be monotone 1171, i.e., the voltage drops on all nodes increase by increasing the loading currents. When the current variations are correlated: this means that all currents may increase simultaneously, so that caSe file analysis may be performed reflecting realistic situations. This can he done at the (meani3o) corners of die-t.*die variations, or at more agressive points (e.g., the 50th percentile). Therefore, the analysis of random die-tedie variations can proceed by analyzing a set of deterministic cases.
The considerations are different for within-die variations. Due to their locality on the die area, t,he occurrence of worstcase deviations uniformly across the die is highly unlikely, and enumerating cases becomes prohibitive. Instead, stat,istical analysis needs t,o be performed. Fig. 1 illustrates the situation. Suppose, in t,his figure, that nodes 1, 2, and 3 of the power grid provide supply voltage connections t o circuit elements lying on a critical path (referred to thereafter as c~t i m l nodes), and that for timing purposes, it was determined that the voltage levels on these nodes need to be simultaneously greater than 90% of V d d .
The figure illustrates the voltage drops contributed by active current, nominal leakage, die-to-die, and n-ithin-die leakage variations. Within-die variations are shou-n to have a certain probability distribution, which necessarily precludes t.he ability to determine with 100% confidence whether the required voltage levels ase greater than 90% of V d d . The need for joint node voltage statistics is clear as we seek statistics on the simultaneous distributions ofthe voltage drop at critical nodes, in order to have the ability to explore the margin of within-die variations efficiently. The sequel focuses on t,he joint statistics of within-die variations of voltage drops.
JOINT STATISTICS OF POWER GRID NODE VOLTAGE DROPS
It is helpful to distinguish between t,wo types of leakage in integrated circuits. A circuit certainly draws leakage current when it is in standby or sleep mode, what may he referred t o as the standby leakage. The circuit also draws leakage .current when it is active. Indeed, a logic gate draws leakage current any time dhat it,s supply is "on." Even inside a switching window, part of t,he current drawn from I he supply niay be attributed to leakage. The leakage drawn by the circuit during its active (non-standby) states, may be referred to as the dynamic leakage. The grid response to standby leakage may be obtained by a DC analysis of the grid, using only a resistive model, whereas response to dynamic leakage requires a transient analysis, using an RC or RLC model of the grid. Our statistical formulation to follow, directly applies to standby leakage. Dynamic leakage may be incorporated through calculation of the mean voltage drops on a t,ransient, basis, as discussed in section 4.1.
System Equations
We consider an RC model of the power grid, where each branch of t,he grid is represented by a resistor and where there exists a capacitor from every grid node t o ground. In addit.ion, some nodes have ideal current sources (to ground) representing the current drawn hy the circuit tied to the grid a t that point, and some nodes have ideal volt.age sources (to ground) representing the connections to the external sup- 
where G is an N x N conductance matrix, C is an N x N diagonal matrix of node capacitances, and Vdd is a constant vector each entry of which is equal to V d d . Let u k ( t ) = V d d -w ( t ) be the voltage drop at node k , and let v(t) be the vector of voltage drops, then (3) can be written as:
This is a revised system equation which one can solve directly for the voltage drop values. Notice t,hat the circuit described by (4) consists of the original power grid, but with all the voltage sources set to zero and all the current source directions reversed. In the following, we will mainly he concerned a i t h t,his modified power gndand the revised system of equations (4). In cases when the circuit is, in a standby state, where all the currents are constant, the circuit respouse is obtained using a DC analysis. The DC equivalent of (4) is readily seen as:
Joint Probability Distribution of Node Voltages
DC analysis of t,he power grid leads to an analytical characterization of the probability distribution function of the node voltage drops under within-die leakage current variations. DC analysis is automatically true for t.he case of standby leakage. Thus. our analysis is exact for standby leakage. For dynamic leakage, since the leakage current of a logic gate is constant. when it is not switching, then DC analysis may be acceptable in practice, especially since we will include some dynamics of the system through the computation of the mean response (section 4.1 below).
The DC representation of the power grid system given in (5) can he written as follows:
where VT is the thermal voltage and IO is a constant for our purposes.
If the 1j are lognormal, then the q i j I , are also lognormal.
Hence, under the assumption of statist,ical independence of intra-die leakage variations, the node voltages (7) are each a summation of independent lognormal random variables (RVs). Sums of independent lognormal variables have been extensively studied and characterized in the literature pertaining to communications, and it was found that such sums can be accurately captured by anot.her lognormal RV 131. { ~~~( T y l~~l~l j ) , by virtue of the exponent.ial relation hetween t,he t,ransist,or leakage current and its threshold voltage, which can be seen from the following BSIhl 3 device model of leakage current, in terms of physical and electrical when the corresponding normal vector has a non-singular covariance mabrix. Second, because of its close association to the multivariate normal, full statistics of node voltage drops can he captured hy second-order statistics (means and a covariance matrix). Finally, any k-vector taken from an n-dimensional lognormal vector (k 5 n ) is (multivariate) lognormal itself.
Nos. we can put the above to use in our problem. Let VI, he the k-vector of critical nodes of the power grid. k is expected to be much smaller than N , the dimension of the grid. V I , will he modeled as a lognormal vector. Let Wk = ln (Vk) and let p w k and CW, be respectively the mean vec- N;e recognize that the difficulties associated with performing the above operations are numerical, as multivariate manipulations are tedious. The first difficulty is to estimate the parameters of bhe multivariate lognormal distribtion, for which n-e propose a hlonte Carlo approach (section 4.2).
Since n e expect the number k of crit.ical nodes to he much smaller than the size . N of the grid, and indeed only a few tens of nodes may need to be considered, the dimensions are manageable for storing non-sparse covariance mat,rices, as %-ell as calculating the determinant and matrix inverse. The evaluation of the multidimensional integral given in (11) must be handled with numerical techniques, but is alleviated by the fact that the integrand is a smooth function and that the domain of integration is a "hyper-rectangle". In our experiments, we performed the multiple integration using hlonte Carlo methods.
ESTIMATION OF THE DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS

Estimation oPThe Mean Vector of Voltage Drops
Since the system (4) is linear, then due to linearity of the mean ( E [ . ] ) operator 1221, one can write:
Thus, solving the system (1) once, using simply the means of the within-die leakage current variations as input,s, yields mean voltage drops at all the nodes obtained from the dynaniic model of the grid.
Estimation of The Covariance Matrix of Voltage Drops
\Ve start by deriving an analytical expression for the covariance of the voltage at every node. Under static condit.ions, the system (13) is simplified to its DC version:
We now combine (5) and (14) to yield:
hlultiplying each side by its transpose and applying the expected value operator to each side, leads to:
E[(I-E[II)(I-E[II)T] (16)
We recognize the expectations as being simply covariance matrices [22], so t.hat the above result can be rewritten as:
Since G is symmetric, G = G T . Therefore, (17) becomes:
Under the assumption of statistical independence of leakage currents, implying that CI is diagonal, it can he seen from (18) 
where q,, is as defined in (7) and c : , is the variance of the ith leakage current, that is, the ith diagonal entry of the covariance matrix of leakage currents.
The solution of (19) We can now use methods of mean estimation from statist,ics, hasically Monte Carlo random sampling [27], in order to est.imate the population mean pi, using the mean of a much smaller sample (say, of size n << N ) from t,he population, i.e., using the sample mean. Using a xeighted random number generator, we generate according to t,he probahilities pi a sequence of indices of columns of G-' t o be included in the sample. From these, a e form the following sample mean for every pair of rows i and j for Tt-hich nodes i and j are critical:
where C is the set of indices included in the random sample.
Note that with a total of k nodes, there will be a total of (: ) = k(k -1)/2 pairwise covariances (OK-diagonal entries) and k variances, for a total of k(k + 1)/2 distinct entries to be estimated. By symmetry of the covariance matrix, the remaining k ( k -1)/2 entries can be deduced, but do not need to be stored.
We also compute the sample standard deviation of qij. sij 2 0 given by: is normal with 0 mean and unit variance 1271, for large n. Fig. 2 illustrates the sampling process for estimating the ccvariance between nodes 1 and 3. The convergence of the sample mean is directly related to the sample standard deviation. We can use tables of the st,andard normal to establish how large n should be in order for the sample standard deviation of q ; j t o be small enough for it to be a viable estimator of p , j , with a certain confidence, and up tn a predefined tolerance [27]. For example, if it is desired to have ( 1 -a ) x 100% confidence (where a is a small positive number, 0 < R < 1) t.hat the following is t,rue: I&j -Uijl < r, (253 then it is known from sampling t.heory [27] that n should be larger than no ahere:
where 2-12 is such that the area to the right of it under the pdf of the standard normal curve is equal to 4 2 . Thus, for instance, for 90% confidence, R = 0.05 and t a p = 1.96; for 99% confidence, a = 0.01 and z n j 2 = 2.575. In practice, one samples until n is larger t,han 30 or 50 or so, then starts to use (26) t,o monitor convergence. Observe that tables are not needed to compute zap. a task that can be done by software (e.g., using the err() function) and that z-12 needs to be evaluated only once.
Next, we need to choose a meaningful bound t for use in (26). We opted to relate the value of the error in t,he estimation of the covariance matrix entries to the reference voltage V d d , as w e did for the variance estimation in [IO] .
Con"rr2ence/ O^,,=si, 3 or I~C mern O f q , k q l k 10 4,? Figure 2 : Estimating t h e covariance b e t w e e n nodes 1 a n d 3 on the power grid. Figure 3 : Choice of error b o u n d t i n the two cases w h e n (a) yo is small and (b) yo is not so small. Let 6 he a small positive number, 0 < 6 < 1. We define our error bound as follows:
In other words, w e want to find e , to be used in (26), as a function of 6 in order for the following to be true:
To simplify the notation, let x = ut, and xo = @ j . Also, let y = 6 = and yo = 6 = 6, and let y =
v d d / & .
Notice that y > 0. We want to find in terms of 6 so that:
There are two cases to consider, according to whether yo is small or not, as shown in Fig. 3 . When yo is small, small enough so that yo -y < 0, then (since y > 0 in all cases) in order to guarantee that Iy -yo1 < y, it is sufficient to impose an upper bound on y in the simple form y -yo < y. This is achieved by imposing an upper bound on x in the simple form x-xo < e l r where tl is the corresponding upper bound on ( x -xo), as shown in Fig. 3(a) . Let A x = x ~ xo and Ay = y -yo. Since y2 = x, then 4(yz) = Ax, and since A(y2) = (yo +Ay) -y o = (Ay)*+2yoAy, then A x = ((Ay)* + 2yoAy). For AY = 7. €1 = A s = (7' + ZYOY) > 0.
In order to guarantee (29), in this case, we need to set t = When yo is not so small, i.e., when yo -y > 0, then we need t,o consider both upper bounds and lower hounds, as shown in Fig. 3(b) . If €2 is t,he lower bound on (x -ZO), as shown in the figure, then we may compute €2 by set,ting Ay = -7, ahich leads to A x = (y2 -2yo7) < 0, and n e set €2 = -A x = (2yoy -7 ' ) > 0. Since r 2 < r l , as is obvious from the expressions found for each, then, in order to guarantee (29) in this case, we need to set 6 = e2 = Notice that t.he condit,ion yo > y translates to gij > (ay07 -7 9 .
621$t/S. In summary, then:
Notice also that, in either case, e > 62V2d/S. Plugging (30) into (26) leads to:
where t,he + 01 -sign depends on whether qjj is smaller or larger than S2V&/S, respectively. To summarize, if it is desired to estimate to within h 5 & , with (1 -a) x 100% confidence: then n must be larger than the threshold given by (31). This provides a useful trade-off between accuracy and speed, as more samples would be required for smaller 6.
Estimation of The Parameters of The Lognormal Distribution
The previous two suhsect,ions dealt with estimating bhe mean and covariance matrix of the vector of voltage drops due to leakage variations. In tlie terminology of suhsect,ion 3.2, these refer to the mean, pvkr and covariance matrix, Cv,, of Vr, whereas the parameters to he used in the expression of the probahilit,y dist.ribution function given in (11) are p w k and C w , , the mean vector and covariance matrix of the associated k-dimensional normal vector. \Ve show how to obtain these parameters for the lognormal. 
(34)
The only unknowns in (34) are the diagonal entries ni, of Cw,, which can thus be soloed one by one. Then we plug these solved values into (3?), and solve for tlie entries of 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed rnet,hod has been implemented and tested on a number of test-case grids. Not having access to power grids from industrial designs, and because we need a large number of grids t o test our approach under different conditions, we have opted to genemte a number of grids ourselves. Tlie grid generation process is automatic, and employs a random number generator, as well as user-specified dechnology and topology parameters. Starting with a square uniform grid of a given size, we proceed to randomly delete a user-specified percentage of nodes, thus rendering the grid structurally non-uniform. Typical geometric and physical grid characderistics (e.g. grid dimensions) as well as characteristics of the fabrication process (e.g. sheet resist,ance of a particular level of met.allization) are given by the user, leading to an initial value of t,he conductance of every branch. When a node is deleted, the conductances of the reniaining surrounding edges (branches) are increased by a random amount, around a user-specified percentage of t.heir initial values. The rationale behind this is t o allow the nonuniform grid to be loaded with currents comparable bo its uniform predecessor while exhibiting comparable IR-drops.
The number of Vdd (C4) sites and leakage current sources are supplied by the user; the C4s and current sources are then distributed at random over the grid nodes. This implementat.ion was done by srit,ing C programs, and factorization of the grid system was carried out by LU, using rout,ines from Table 1 illustrates results where a number of nodes critical nodes were randomly selected to he critical, and the probability of timing violations was calculated using our method. In this table, we compare the proposed column-sampling approach for the estimation of the covariance matrix of crit-27,864 nede* TI ical nodes ("Sampling"), with the result of calculating the entries of this matrix by full solution of (18) ("Solution"). The numerical integration was performed using hlonte Carlo by our column sampling method, versus the exact covariance matrix entries, obtained by full solution of (18). As can be seen from this figure, the estimated (co)variances match well with the exact ones. Fig. 5 corroborates the fact that voltage drops are well modeled by a lognormal distribution. If indeed voltage drops are lognormally distributed, then their logarithms are normal. We checked t,his cooclusion empirically by generating several grids and collecting voltage drop data, then verifying graphically the goodness-of-fit of their logarithms on normal scores plots 128). It is clear that voltage drops showed good fits, except for certain outliers, validating the choice of lognormal distributions to model the voltage drops on the power grid, induced by independent,, within-die leakage current variations. Fig. 6 plots the joint bivariate pdf of two randomly selected nodes of a grid of 10,000, after estimating its lognormal parameters. It can he observed from this figure that the probabilit,y distribution has vely high density in a relatively small area in the voltage drop domain, and vanishes rapidly outside this area. techniques 191. The basic implementation is to estimate the average of the integrand over the domain of integration via random sampling. For numerical integrations in multiple dimensions, hlonte Carlo methods are often the only riable alternative. However, when the integrand is strongly concentrated in a relatively small "area" of the domain of integration, wit,h vast differences among values inside and outside t.hat "area" of concentration, sampling the integrand over the entire domain of integration in order to estimate its average may be unwieldy. We were able to obtain converging values for integrals of up to ten dimensions, as shon-n in table 1, where we often had to break down the domain of integration into multiple smaller subsets. As can he seen, the overall accuracy is satisfactory, nhile the speedup was up to 130X.
We implemented our technique for grids with a larger number of critical nodes to obt,ain the mean and covariance matrix of the voltage drop distribution, as shown in table 2. As can be seen, the statistical distributions of grids of up to 78,000 nodes were obtained in less than two minutes. IQe note that having a large number of cridical nodes on the grid is not a typical situation in pract,ice. Short clock periods and a small number of logic levels, characteristic of high-speed circuits, effectively limit the number of such nodes to be considered simultaneously. Furthermore, it will he possible to eliminate neighboring nodes from consideration in a critical path as these nodes display essentially the same voltage levels at all t i m e and constitute practically electrically identical points. In case the number of critical nodes remains high, then more advanced integration methods can be used to calculate the probability of timing violations [12].
CONCLUSION
As the impact, of process variations and leakage current increases, the power grid may suffer high voltage drops causing failure to meet timing requirements and jeop.zidizing the design functionality. This work focused on t,he impact of leakage current variations on the power grid and proposed a st,atistical model for the grid voltage drops that must he used to account for leakage variations, in order t,o check the susceptibility of a circuit to timing violations. 
